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Cert. to CA 4 (per 
Russell; Winter 
dissenting) 
Federal/Criminal · 'I'imely 
SUMMARY: The issue presented is whether a man may be con-
victed for possessing a firearm after he has been convicted of a 
felony even though he was denied assistance of counsel at the 
time he previously was convicted. 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: In 1961, petitioner was convicted 
of a felony in the Florida courts. In this proceeding, he was 
- 2 -
charged for violating 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a} (1}, which pro-
vides: 
"Any person who-- (1} has been convicted by a court of th.e 
United States or of a state or any political subdivision 
thereof of a felony . • and who receives, possesses, or 
transports in commerce or affecting commerce any 
firearm shall be fined ... or imprisoned . • " 
On the day of trial, petitioner's attorney informed the 
trial court that he had just learned that petitioner had been 
denied assistance of counsel at the time of the 1961 conviction, 
and sought a continuance to procure copies of the Florida court 
records to prove this fact. The trial judge denied the continu-
ance on the ground that whether petitioner was denied assistance 
of counsel at the time of his prior conviction was immaterial to 
the offense charged. Petitioner was tried and convicted on the 
basis of undisputed evidence that he had been convicted of a 
felony and had possessed a weapon which previously had been 
shipped in interstate commerce. 
A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. It construed 
§ 1202 (a} (1} as evidencing an intent to make the historical fact 
of a felony conviction, not theretofore vacated, sufficient to 
establish the crime without regard for whether the conviction 
was invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright. It further held that 
§ 1202(a} (1} was constitutional as so construed, because even a 
conviction obtained witho~t defense counsel establishes probable 
cause to believe the defendant had committed a felony, and Con-
- 3 -
gress may prohibit a man from possessing firearms if there is 
probable cause to believe . he has committed a felony. The court 
noted that other Circuits had reached a contrary result. 
Judge Winter dissented. He found no support for the court's 
conclusion as to legislative intent, noting that § 1202 (a} (1} 
was introduced as a last minute amendment on the floor without 
any legislative history addressing this precise issue. He fur-
ther concluded that the statute was unconstitutional as con-
strued by the majority. He argued that the case was indistin-
guishable from this Court's decisions holding that a conviction 
obtained in violation of Gideon may not be used for purposes of 
a recidivist prosecution, Burgett v. Texas, 389 u.s. 109 (1976}, 
or to impeach a criminal defendant, Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 
(1972}. 
CONTENTIONS: Petitioner contends that a prior felony convic-
tion obtained in violation of the defendant's right to counsel 
may not be used to establish a violation of § 1.202 (a} (1}. He 
argues that the decision below is contrary to Gideon v. Wain-
wright, Burgett, Loper, and United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 
443 (1972} (conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may not 
be considered in fixing sentence}. He observes that there is a 
substantial conflict among the Circuits on the issue. The Sev-
enth and Ninth Circuits hold that convictions in violation of 
Gideon may not be used to establish violations of § 1202 (a} (1), 
while the Third, Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits are in agree-
· - 4-
ment with the decision below. 
The Solicitor General agrees that certiorari should be 
granted to resolve the conflict among the Circuits, even though 
he contends that the decision below was correct. 
DISCUSSION: This case squarely presents a constitutional 
issue on which there is a substantial division among the Courts 
of Appeals. In addition, the decision below seems inconsistent 
with this Court's decisions in Burgett, Loper and Tucker. 
There is a response. 
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~-~. 
Mr. Justice Powell ~~,Lo~ 
~~-1-o~~ 
Re: No. 78-1595, Lewis v. United State  ~ )ls 
~ ;.;:;;. - ..e'.e.k. ~ 
1. ISSUE PRESENTED. 
tJ-/" ~ - 1 /> /-o H-..JA.. c~,t_~_.. /J-;-:. 
1 8 U. ~.C. App. _§ 1 20 2 (a) ( 1 ) ... ...,..... ---, 
provides that "any person who ••. has be:/ t!:;{;,~ CZ 4./.V 
htt.'-"~ ~ . 
the United States or of a State or any political subdivision . ___ o.n 
--~ ~ ~~~~U/~ 
~- · thereof of a felony .•• and who receives, possesses, or transports 
1.1~ ~. d"~ vP~ 
~ · in commerce or affecting commerce ..• any firearm shall be fined ..__ 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, 
or both." 
§ 1202(c)(2) defines "felony" as "any offense 
=-
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but 
does not include any offense (other than one involving a firearm 
2. 
or explosive) classified as a misdemeanor under the laws of a 
State and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or 
less." 
§ 1 20 3 provides that § 1 20 2 is not applicable to any 
prisoner who has been entrusted with a firearm by prison 
authorities, or any person who has been pardoned and authorized 
to receive firearms by the President or chief executive of a 
State. 
The question in this case is whether a defendant who is 
a previously convicted felon may challenge the constitutionality 
of his prior conviction under Gideon v. Wainwright as a defense 
to a prosecution under~ 1202(a) (1). 
2. DISCUSSION. The legislative history of §§ 1202 & "UAJt~ 
1203 is~ These sections were added as a last minute floor ~~ . 
amendment in the Senate to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe "~ · 
Streets Act. "The Amendment was hastily passed, with little 
discussion, no hearings, and no report." United States ::..:._ Bass, 
404 U.S. 336, 344 (1971). When Senator Long introduced the -
amendment he stated that "[w]hile we may be willing for a 
citizen to have a gun for the defense of his home ••• we do not 
want the murderers, the burglars, the rapists, the looters, or 
the arsonists armed to the teeth and walking the streets. We do 
not want the habitual criminals who have committed all sorts of 
crimes armed and presenting a hazard to law-abiding citizens." 
114 Cong. Rec. 13868 ( 1968). This langauge demonstrates that 
vr/ 
3. 
Congress wished to prevent dangerous persons from obtaining 
firearms. The legislative history does not, however, provide a 
clear indication that Congress intended that a person who 
"face[d] the danger of conviction because he [did] not know how 
to establish his innocence" Powell .::..:._ f\labama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-
69 (1932), should be considered to be a "felon" under § 
1202(a)(1). 
The SG argues that the structure of the Omnibus Act 
~ 
demonstrates that Congress wished to employ even an invalid .... ~......__., 
conviction as indicative of dangerousness under§ 1202 (a)(1). 
The SG relies heavily on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) & (h) which makes it 
unlawful for any person "who is under indictment for, or who has 
been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to ship or receive 
firearms. The SG contends that because person convicted without 
~ 
a lawyer more likely to be dangerous than a person who has been - '\ - - ~ -- -
indicted, 
...___ 
Congress must have intended that a person convicted 
--------------~ 
without a lawyer be barred from purchasing a firearm. Whether 
or not the SG' s assessment of dangerousness is accurate, the 
simple fact is that the scope of § 1202(a) ( 1) is more limited 
than§ 922(g), and that, therefore, the desire of Congress to 
~
reach persons who have been indicted under § 922(g) has little 
relevance to an interpretation of §1202(a) (1). 
The SG also argues that the presence of §1203 mandates 
a a broad construction of§ 1202(a)(1). The SG says that§ 1203 
4. 
permits two exceptions to the application of § 1202 and, 
therfore, this Court should be reluctant to create a third 
exception that Congress failed to create. This argument 
slighlty mischaracterizes the issue in the case. The question is 
not whether a person convicted in violation of Gideon should be 
excluded from the operation of § 1202(a) (1); rather it is 
whether Congress ever intended such a person to be included 
within the prohibition. The presence of exemptions for persons 
who do fall within §1202(a)(1) does not define the scope of§ 
1202(a)(1). 
Two r ~ ules of statutory construction relevant to this 
case suggest that the petitioenr's position should be adopted. 
c§ is the principle that a statute to be construed so as to 
avoid a serious constitutional --concerning the ambit of criminal question.~, statutes should be "ambiguity resolved in 
favor of lenity." Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 
(1971). Although the SG argues that ~ 1202(a) (1) is not 
ambiguous enough to allow the use of either rule of statutory 
construction, I believe that the language and legislative 
hi~~ of that statute is sufficiently unclear so as to permit 
reliance on these guildeines. 
This Court's cases concerning the use of convictions 
obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright suggest that the - . 
statute should not be interpreted in the manner favored by the 
SG. In Burgett v. United States, 389 u.s. 109 (1967), a 
5. 
defendant had been indicted for assault with intent to murder, 
and for being an habitual offender because he had previously 
been convicted of four other felonies. The indictment was read 
to the jury. When the State attempted to offer proof of the 
previous convictions, the defense objected on the ground that 
they had been obtained in violation of Gideon. The trial judge 
sustained some of the defense objections, allowed evidence of a 
Tennessee conviction to be introduced, but ordered the jury not 
to consider the prior convictions. The habitual offender charge 
was taken from the jury, presumably because the trial judge 
found that the defendant had not been validly convicted 
sufficient times to invoke the recidivist statute. The jury 
found the defendant guilty of assault with intent to murder. 
This Court stated that the trial court erred in 
allowing the introduction of evidence of the Tennesee conviction 
because the records of that conviction raised a presumption that 
the defendant had been denied his right to counsel, and the 
trial court could not presume waiver of that right from a silent 
record. "To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon 
~ Wainwright to be used against a person either to support 
guilt or to enhance punishment for another offense ••• is to erode 
the principle of that case. Worse yet, since the defect in the 
prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the 
accussed in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that 
Sixth Amendment right." 388 U.S. at 11 5. The Court then held 
6. 
that the conviction for assault with intent to murder was 
invalid because the trial court had allowed introduction of the 
invalid convcition. In ~urgett, therefore, this Court stated it 
was error for a trial court to allow consideration of a 
conviction which was shown to be invalid under Gideon and stated 
that an uncounselled felony convicton could not be used under an 
habitual offender statute. 
In subsequent cases, this Court has held that a 
conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may not be used for 
/ 
sentencing pruposes, VUnited States v. Tucker, 404 u.s. 443 
--~ 
(1972), or to impeach a defendant who has testified, Loper~ 
Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1973). In ~per, as in Burgett, the 
constitutionality of the prior conviction was raised in 
proceedings concerning the validity of a subsequent conviction. 
Id. at 476. The effect of these cases would seem to be that the 
use of an uncounselled felony conviction to obtain a conviction 
under §1202(a)(1) is unconstitutional. Indeed, the use of the 
previous conviction in this case is identical to its proposed 
use under the habitual offender statute considered in Burgett. 
In both situations, a previous convict ion forms part of the 
predicate of a subsequent, and analytically, 
The SG argues that Burgett and -
distinguishable from this case. First, the 
separate offense. $ & 
its progeny are~~ 
SG arques that an '::j.d:Jt: 
uncounselled conviction is not always invalid, see Scott v. 
Illinois. While it is true that Scott states that all 
7. 
uncounseled convictions are not constitutionally i~id, Scott 
offers no support for the contention that a conviction which is 
constitutionally invalid may be used at trial. Second, the SG 
says that the rationale of the Burgett 1 ine of cases was that 
the invalid convictions were unreliable whereas the focus of § 
1202(a) ( 1) is on the fact of the previous conviction, not its 
reliability. This argument begs the question of whether Congress 
meant to include persons with invalid convictions within --
§1202(a)(1). Moreover, it seems more logical to assume that 
Congress used the presence of a conviction as a indicator of 
dangerousness. Insofar as the conviction is less reliable 
because it was obtained in violation of Gideon, it is presumably 
also less predictive of future dangerouseness. Third, the SG 
contends that in Burgett the government first attempted to use 
the prior uncounselled conviction at the time of the subsequent 
trial whereas § 1202(a) (1) imposes a liability upon a person as 
soon as the previous felony conviction is final. But the effect 
of the habitual offender statute in Burgett and§ 1202(a0(1) is 
identical. Both laws inform a convicted felon that the 
commission of certain additional acts will subject him to a new 
criminal penalty. In sum, I believe that the use of a prior 
uncounselled felony conviction in this case is in sufficient 
tension with the reasoning of Burgett, Tucker and Loper that 
§1202(a) (1) should be ~d to allow a defendant to challenge the 
use of a prior conviction on the ground that it was obtained in 
/~ 
. . 8 . 
violation of Gideon v. Wainwright. 
S fl Js The SG raises two related objections to a decision in ~ 
~· ~~~ 
the petitioner's favor. l~ -~~/ ' he argues that ~1 constitutional
challenges to previous convictions would have to be considered 
in a §1202(a)(1) proceeding. This issue need not be decided in 
the present case. Moreover, it may be that constitutional 
claims that do not challenge the reliability of the conviction 
would not have to be considered in a§ 1202(a)(1) proceeding. 
But the existence of a Gideon violation attacks "the very 
integrity of the fact-finding process." Loper~ Beto, 405 U.S. 
at 484. Qe~ the SG arques that consideration of previous 
convictions would be disruptive and time consuming. ALthough 
that potential exists, it is unlikely so long as the issue in 
dispute is whether a petitioner was represented by counsel at a 
prior trial. In some cases it may be difficult to ascertain 
whether a defendant had the assistance of counsel, see Loper ~ 
Beto, 405 U.S. at 500 (Rehnquist J., dissenting with whom the 
Chief Justice ~nd Blackmun & Powell, JJ. joined), but a Gideon 
claim is more likely to be easily resolved than other 
constitutional issues. 
3. SUMMARY. The question is whether a defendant who is 
a previously convicted felon may challenge the constitutionality 
of his prior conviction under Gideon ~ Wainwright as a defense 
to a prosecution under§ 1202(a)(1). Because the legislative 
history of § 1 20 2 (a) ( 1 ) is ambiguous, two principles of 
'. 9. 
statutory construction should be consulted: (1) A statute should 
be construed to avoid an unconstitutional result, and (2) 
ambiguity in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of 
the defendant. The reasoning of the cases prohibiting the use of 
convictions obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright 
suggests that use of an invalid conviction in this case would 
probably be unconstitutional. Therefore, the statute should be 
construed in the petitioner's favor. 
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January 23, 1980 
78-1595 Lewis v. u.s. 
Dear Bill: 
I note that you will draft a dissent in the above 
case. 
Although my vote was a bit "shaky", I am still 
leaning your way and certainly will await your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rrennan 
lfp/ss 
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tst n RAFT RacirrlllrtoCl· 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm 
No. 78-1595 
Pt>titiOJJer On Writ of Certiorari to the United 
' States Court of Appeals for thQ 
George C'alviu Lewis, Jr.,l 
_ v. Fourth Circuit. J ' 
t:mt~>d , tates. · 4 
[February -, 1980] ~ 
MR. JuRTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. /.,AI Q 1 t 5 
This case presents the question whether a defeudant's f 
extant prior conviction, flawed because he was without coun-~ 
sel, as required by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 
may const1tute the predicate for a subsequellt conviction under 
§ 1202 (a) ( 1) , as amended , of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. ·c. App. 
§ 1202 (a) ( 1).1 
I 
In 1961 petitioner George Calvin Lewis, Jr. , upon his plea 
1 Section 1:202 (a) n·ads in full: 
"Any prr~un who-
" (1) has lwc·n eonvi C'trd by a eourt. of thr United Stairs or of a State or 
any politirHI ~ubdi v i ,;ion thereof of a felony , or 
" (2) ha,; he(•n di~rhargPd from thr Armed Force~ under dishonorable 
condition, , or 
" (3) ha~ I)('Cil adjudged by a court of the UnitPcl Sta!Ps or of a State 
or any polttlr:tl ~nbdivi~ion tlwrrof of hPing mentally in('otnpet<·nt, or 
''(4) having h<'!'ll a citizen of the United State~ has renounced hi:s citi-
zenship, or 
" (5) being an alien is ill('.gally or unlawfully in thr United Stales, 
"and who rereJV<'~, pos~r~H('S, or t rnnsport ;; in commE·n·e or afff'etmg C'om-
merce, after the datP of ruactrnent of thi:; Act, any firrarm ~ hall b(' fined 
not more than $10,000 or: imprisoned for not niore than two yrars, or 
both / ' 
78-1595-0PINION 
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of guilty, was convicted in a Florida state court of a felony 
for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misde-
meanor. Ree Fla. Stat. § 810.05 (1961). He served a term of 
imprisomnent. That conviction has never been overturned, 
nor has petitioner ever received a qualifying pardon or per-
mission from the Secretary of the Treasury to possess a fire-
arm. Sec 18 U. S. C. App. § 1203 (a) and "18 U. S. C. 
§ 925 (c). 
In January 1977, Lewis, on probable cause, was arrested in 
Virginia, and later was charged by indictment with having 
knowingly received and possessed at that time a specified 
firearm, w violation of 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202 (a)(1). 2 He 
waived a .i ury and was given a bench trial. It was stipulated 
that the "' Papon in question had been shipped in interstate 
commerce. The Government introduced in evidence an exem-
plified copy of the judgment and sentence in the 1961 Florida 
felony proceeding. App. 10. 
ShorLly before the trial, petitioner's counsel illformed the 
court tbat he had been advised that Lewis was not represented 
by counsel in the 1961 Florida proceediug.a He claimed that 
2 ThP imltetmeJJt a];:o eharge~l prtitioll('r with a violation of lR U. . C. 
§ !)22 (h) (1) That ~tatutr read:; in pertinent part : 
"It :-;hall lw unlawful for any ppr,.;on-
" ( 1) who 1:- uudPr indictment for, or who hal:i bPen eouvirted in any 
court of, a c·nnu· pullil:ihable by impn~onment for a term exeerding one 
year; 
"to rrot>ivc1 any fire:mn ... whic·h has been ~hipped or transported in 
inter:;tate ... c·ommeree." 
Petitiorwr we~:-~ ac·quitted on the § 922 (h) (1) charge and it i::. not before 
us here . 
3 Petit.ioncr'b (·oun:;el l:itated thai. a Florida n.t.torncy had advi~ed him 
that the C'Ourt rPeord8 in that. State ~howed affirmatiYely that Lewis had 
no lawyer. Ht> noted al:;o that Lewil:' had been charged with the same 
offenl:ie 11~ had thr defrndant in Gideon v. WaintNight, :172 U. S. 3:35 
(196:~) , nnd that pPtitwnPr hnd been tried in the ~amr State abont Hix 
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under Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, a violation of § 1202 
(a) (1) coulcl not be predicated on a prior conviction obtained 
in violation of petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. The court rejected that claim, ruling that the con-
stitutionality of the outstanding Florida conviction was imma-
terial with respect to petitioner's status uncler ~ 1202 (a) ( 1) 
as a previously couvictecl felon at the time of his arrest. Peti-
tioner, accordingly, oft'ered no evidence as to whether in fact 
he hatllwen convicted in 1961 without the aid of counsel. We 
therefore assume, for present purposes, that he was without 
counsel at that time. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. by a divided vote, affirmed. 5D1 F. 2d 978 
(1979). It held that a defenclant, purely as a defense to a 
prosecutio11 under~ 1202 (a)(1), could not attack collaterally 
an outstancling prior felouy COJlviction, and that the statutory 
prohibition applied irrespective of whether that prior convic-
tion was subject to collateral attack. The Court of Appeals 
also rejected Lewis' constitutional argument to the eft'ect that 
the use of the prior conviction as a preclicate for his prosecu-
tion under~ 1202 (a)(l) violated his rights uncler the Fifth 
and Sixth AnH:'nchnents. 
Becausp of conflict among the Courts of Appeals/ we 
granted certiorari. 442 1!. S.- (1979). 
4 C'ompan· f ' 11ited States v. Lufman, 457 F. 2d (CA7 1!-17::!) (u~c of nn 
undcrl~·mg fp]ony eonvietion unconstitutionally obtaitwd to ~liJlJlOI't :~ 
con\'ietion undPr § 1202 (a) (1) i~ r<•ver,;iblr error) with th<• Fourth Cir-
cuit'o; ruliug in the pres<·nt <'ase, and with United States v. Mauganl, 573 
F . 2d 02G (C'Ati Hl7~); and United States v. Grave:s, 554 F . 2d (i5 (CA:3 
1977) (en banr) (elaim of con~titutional error in the tmd<•rlyiug eonvic-
tion rna~· not be rnii'ied). Tlw :\mth Circuit hm; dio;tinguii'iiH:'d betwepn a 
claim of eon~tJtutwnal invalidity in the underlying conviction, which it ha" 
held may he nll~<'d, and a claim that the und<'rlying convictiOn ha:-< bPen, 
or should bt•, rPV<'f~0d on other grou11dR. Compare Cnited .States v. 
U'Neal , 545 F 2d R5 (1976), and United States v. Pril'epaul. 540 F . 2d 
417 (197o) , w1th ['nited States , .. Liles, 4:32 F. 2d 18 (1!:!70) . SE·e alo;o 
United &ofl!8 \. li errl!ll, 5R8 F. 2d 711 (CA9 1!:!7:8), <:ert. drniPd, 4!01 
78-1595-0PINION 
4 LEWIS v. UNITED STAT.ES 
II 
Four cases decided by this Court provide the focus for peti-
tioner's attack upon his conviction. The first, and pivotal 
one. is Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, where the Court held that 
a state felony conviction without counsel, and without a valid 
waiver of counsel, was unconstitutional under the Sixth and 
U.S. 9fi.t (1079) (undPrl~·ing conviction in :1 prosPcution under 18 U.S. C. 
§ 922 (h) (I) may not. be ehallPngPd on nonconstitutional grounds). 
Tlw identical i~sue that i~ pre~ented in this case ha~ alHo ari~en in the 
context of ehallt•uge~ to convietion~ under 18 U. S. C. § 922 (g) (1) (pro-
1-criuing ~luppmg or tnmH]lort of a firearm in inter::;tate or foreign com-
mere<' h) a p<'rHon under indictment for, or convicted of, a felony) and 
§ 9:22 (h) ( 1) (pru~cribing rPcript of a firearm ~hipped in intero:;tate or 
foreign eouimNcl' by :<neh a Jler~on). Compare United States v. Scales, 
S99 F . 2d /,'- (CAS 1979); Dameron Y. United States, 488 F. 2d 724 (CAS 
1974); Pa~terchik v. Uuited States, 466 F. 2d 1367 (CA9 1972); and 
United 8Late~ v. DuShane, 43S F. 2d 1H7 (CA2 1970) (underlying convic-
tion may br attac·ked u::; unconstitutional) with Barker v. Vuited States, 
S79 F . 2d 1219. 1226 (CAlO 1978) (underlying conviction may not be so 
rhallt•ng<'d iu vmsrcution under § 922 (h) (1)). 
Thr Court::; of Appeab hnvr treated the io>sne somewhat d11ferently in 
Jlro:-;ec·utwn~ under lH ll. S. C. § 922 (a) (H) (prohibiting thr falsification 
of one'~ statu~ a~ a convicted felon in purcha:;ing a firearm) . Nonuniform-
it~· ha::; prrvallPd nonetheleo:;~ on the quc:;tion whether a defrndant charged 
with violatlll{!; that ::;tatute rna~' challenge thr con~titutionaltty of the 
underlying f(•lon~ <·onvJction. Compare United States '. O'Neal, supm, 
and Unit!!d .State~ Y. Pli.cepaul, supra, (permitting thP challenge) with 
Uuited States ' . Allen, SS6 F. 2d 720 (CA4 1977); United States v. 
Gmvrs, supra; and Cassity Y. United States, S21 F. 2d 1320 (CA6 197S) 
(holding that tlw challenge may uot be made). The Eighth Circuit has 
!:'fated that If will not permit a challenge to thr constitutionality of the 
underl~· iug convwtiou where tlw defendant is charged undt•r § 922 (a.) (6), 
while re:;prving thr question undrr § 1202 (a) (1) and §§ 922 (g) (1) aud 
(h)(l) . ( 'mted .States v. Edward8, S68 F. 2d 68,70-72, and 11.3 (1977) . 
See al~o l 'mted .States v. Graves, SS4 F. 2d, at 83-88 (Garth, J. & Seitz, 
C . .T ., concnJTing t\: di:ss?IHing) (thr Government nred not prove the 
validity of the umlerlying conviction in a prosecution brought under § 922' 
(a)((j) , but it mu::;t do so in a prosecution under §1202 (a)(1)) .. 
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Fourteenth Amelldments. That's fully retroactive. Kitchens 
v. Smith, 401 U. S. 847 (1971). 
The second case is Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967). 
There the Court held that a conviction invalid under Gideon 
could not be used for enhaucement of punishment under a 
State's recidivist statute. The third is United States v. 
1''ucker, 404 r. S. 443 ( 1972), where it was held that such a 
convictiou could uot be co11sidered by a court iu sentencing 
a defendant after a subsequent conviction. And the fourth is 
Loper v. Beta, 405 U. S. 473 (1972), where the Court dis-
allowed thP use of the couviction to impeach the general 
credibility of the defendant. The prior conviction, the plural-
ity opinion said, "lacked reliability." !d., at 484. quoting 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 F. S. 618, 639, and n. 20 (1965). 
We, of course, accept these rulings for purposes of the 
present cas<>. Petitionet~'s position, however, is that the four 
cases require a reversal of his conviction under ~ 1202 (a) (1) 
on both statutory and constitutional grounds. 
IIl 
The Court has stated repeatedly of late that in any case 
concerning the interpretation of a statute the "starting point" 
must be the language of the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone 
Corp., - F. S. -,- (1979) (slip op., pp. 3-4). 8ee also 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,- U. S. -, - (1979) 
(slip op., pp. 7- 8); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 
-U.S.-. - (1979) (slip op., p. 6). An examination of 
§ 1202 (a) ( 1) reveals that its proscription is directed unam-
biguously at any person who "has been convicted by a court 
of the Unit€•d States or of a State ... of a felony." No modi-
fier is present. and nothing suggests any restriction on the 
scope of th<' trrm "convicted." "Nothing on the face of the 
statuti:' suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage 
to persons l whose convictions are not subject to collateral 
attackj.'' ['nited States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371,373 (1978); 
see United States v. ,\'aftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772 (1979). The: 
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statutory language is sweeping. and its plain meaning is that 
the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability 
until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his 
disabilit by some affirmative action, such as a qualifying 
pardon or consent from the Secretary of the Treasury." The 
obvious breadth of the language may well reflect the expan-
sive legislative approach revealed by Congress' express find-
ings and declarations. in 18 U. S. C. App. § 1201,n concerning 
the problem of firearm abuse by felons and certain specifically 
described persons. 
Other provisions of the statute demonstrate and reinforce 
its broad sweep. Section 1203 enumerates exceptions to 
§ 1202 (a) ( 1) (a prison inmate who by reason of his duties has 
expressly b<'t'll eutrusted with a firearm by prison authority; 
nOne might argnc, of cour~P, that the laugnnge is so swreping that it 
include~ Ill it~ pro~cription Pvert a prr~on whose predicate conviction in 
the interim had lwen finally r<•vrr~ed on appeal and thus no longer was 
outstanding Tlw Gowrnment, however, does not go so far, Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 2H-~O. :{7-.fO, and though W<' have no need io Jursue that extre1 
argument in t n:-- ea~r, we rrJrct it r note, nonetheless, that the di~­
abilit~· pffect rd IJ~ · § 1202 (a) ( 1) would apply while a felony conviction 
was pendmg ou appeal. See ';';otr, Prior Conviction:> and the Gun Control 
Act, of ~' · 1lum. L. Rt•v. 326, :~04, and 11 . 42 (1976 . We are not 
per~u:tdt•d that til!' men• po~sibility of making that argument render:,; the 
~Statute , n~S prlltiotlt'l' suggest~. unconstitutionally vague. 
6 "Tlw Congn·~:-- tere ))" m ~ an ec ar " e erpt, po&>ession, 
or tran,;portat lOll uf a firearm b~· felon~, wteran!:> who are discharged under 
dishonorable eonclition~, mentn.! incompetents, alienl:l who um illegally in 
the rountry, and former ritizeJJR who have renounced thr1r citizenship, 
constitute~-
"(1) a burdl'n on rommerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce, 
"(2) a thrPat to the ;;afety of the Prrsident of the Fnited States and 
Vice Pn·~Jdrnt of tlw United States, 
''(B) an unpt·diuwnt or a threat to the exercil:le of free speeC'h and the 
free exerC'J:oi<' of a rehgion guamnteed by the first amendment to the Cw1-
stit utimt of the l l1tited Statr~, and 
" ( 4) iL threat t 0 the continued and effective O!l<'I'H t ion or t hr Govem-
lnenl of thP Umted States all(! of thr government of earh State guanw- · 
teed by artieh- I\' of the Constitution." 
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a person who has been pardoned and who has expressly been 
authorized to receive, possess, or transport a firearm). In 
addition, § 1202 (c) (2) dennes "felony" to exclude certain 
state crimes punishable by no more than two years imprison-
ment. No exception. however, is made for a person whose 
outstanding felony conviction ultimately might turn out to be 
invalid for any reason. On its face, therefore, § 1202 (a) (1) 
coutaills nothing by way of l'estrictive language. It thus 
stands in contrast with other feueral statutes that explicitly 
permit a defendant to challenge. by way of defense, the valid-
ity or constitutionality of the predicate felony. See, e. g., 18 
U.S. C.~ 3575 (e) (dangerous special offender) aud 21 U.S. C. 
§ 851 (c) (2) (recidivism under the Comprehensive Drug Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970). 
When we turn to the "legislative history of§ 1202 (a)(1), we 
find nothing to suggest that Congress was willing to allow a 
defendant to question the validity of his prior conviction as a 
defense to a charge under -§ f202 (a) (1). The section was 
enacted as part of 'Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Acts of 196"8, 82 Stat. 236. It was added by 
way of a floor amendment to the Act and thus was not a sub-
ject of discussion in the legislative reports. See United States 
v. Batchelder, - U. S. --, - (1979) (slip op., p. 5); 
Scarborough v. United 'States, 431 U. S. 563, 569-570 (1977); 
United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 344, and n. 11 (1971). 
What lititle legisl ive history there is that is relevant reflects 
an intent to impose a firearms disability on any felon based on 
the faet of conviction. Senator Long, who introduced and 
directed the passage of Title VII, repeatedly stressed convic-
tiOl , 11ot a "valid" conviction, and not a conviction not subject 
to constitutioual challenge, as the criterion. For example, the 
·Senator observed: 
"So, under Title VII. every citizen could possess a gun until 
the commission of his first felony. Upon his couviction,. 
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thief and burglar of the right to possess a firearm in the 
future except where he has been pardoned by the Presi-
dent or a State Governor and had been expressedly au-
thorized by his pardon to possess a firearm." 114 Cong. 
Rcc. 14773 (1968). 
See also ~d., at 13868. 14774. Inasmuch as Senator Long was 
the sponsor and floor manager of the bill, his statements are 
entitled to weight. Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 
13 (1978). 
It is not without significance, furthermore, that Title VII, 
as wl'll as Title IV of the Omnibus Act, was enacted in re-
sponse to the precipitous rise in political assassinations, riots,. 
and other violent crimes involving firearms, that occurred in 
this COilntry in the 1960's. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th 
C'oug., 2<1 Ress., 76-78 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess., :22-2a ( 1968). This Court, accordingly, has observed: 
"The legislative history [of Title VII] iu its entirety, 
whilE' brief, further supports the view that Congress 
sought to rule broadly-to keep guns out of the hands of 
thos<' who have demonstrated that 'they may not be 
trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to· 
society. ' " Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S., at 
572. 
The legislative history, therefore. affords no basis for a 
loophole, by way of a collateral constitutional challenge, to 
the broad statutory scheme enacted by Congress. Section 
1202 (a) was a sweeping prophylaxis, in simple terms, against 
misuse of firearms. There is no indication of any intent to 
require the Goverument to prove the validity of the predicate 
convicti011. 
The very structure of the Omnibus Act's Title lV, enacted 
simultaneously with Title VII, reinforces this conclusion. 
Each Title prohibits categories of presumptively dangerous 
person::; from transportiug L ceiviug firearms. See 18: 
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U. S. C. §§ 922 (g) and (h). Actually, with regard to the 
statutory question at issue here, we detect little significant 
difference between Title IV and Title VII. Each seeks to 
keep a firearm away from "any person ... who has been con-
victed" of a felony, although the definition of "felony" differs 
somewhat in the respective statutes. But to limit the scope of 
§§ 922 (g)(1) and (h)(1) to a validly convicted felon would 
be at odds with the statutory scheme as a whole. Those sec-
tions not only impose a disability on a convicted felon but also 
on a person under a felony indictment, even if that person 
subsequently is acquitted of the felony charge. Siuce the 
fact of mere indictment is a disabling circumstance, a fortiori 
the much more significant fact of conviction must deprive the 
person of a right to a firearm. 
Finally, It lS important to note that a convicted felon is 
not without relief. As has been observed above, the Omnibus 
Act, iu ~~ 1203 (2) and 925 (c), states that the disability may 
be removed by a qualif par on or t e Secretary's consen . 
Also, petitioner, before obtaining his firearm, could have chal-
lenged his prior convictio11 in an appropriate proceeding in 
the Florida state courts. See Fla. Const. Art. 5, § 5 (3); 
L'Homrned~eu v. State, 362 So. 2d 72 (Fla. App. 1978); Weir 
v. State, 319 So. 2d 80 (Fla. App. 1975). See also United 
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) .7 
lt seems fully apparent to us that the existence of these 
remedies, two of which are expressly contained in the Omnibus 
Act itself, suggests that Congress clearly intended that the 
defendant clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby 
fulfilling Congress' purpose "broadly to keep firearms away 
from the persons Congress classified as potentially irrespon-
sible and dangerous.'' Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 
218 (197o) . 
7 Thi:, bPing ,.;o, § 1202 (a) (1) doe~ not attach "what may amount to life-
long ~a net 1011~ to a mPre finding of probable cau::lP," a~ haiS bPen argued by 
one comnH'IJbttor. Sc>e Comment, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1790, 17<95 (1979). 
. ~ 
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With the face of the statute and the legislative history so 
c]par, petition<'r's argument that the statute nevertheless 
should be construed so as to avoid a constitutional issue is 
inapposite. That course is appropriate only when the statute 
provides a fair alteruative co11struction. This statute could 
not be more plain. Swain v. Pressly, 430 U. S. 370, 378, and 
n. 11 (1077); United States v. Batchelder, - U. S., at-
(slip op .. pp. 7-8). Similarly, any principle of lenity, see 
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), has no 
application. The touchstone of that principle is sta.tutory 
ambiguity. HuddlestO'II v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 832 
(1974}: l/ nited States v. Batchelder, - U. S., at - (slip 
op. , p. 7). There is no ambiguity here. 
vVe therefore hold that~ 1202 (a) (1) prohibits a felon from 
possessing a firearm despite the fact that the predicate felony 
may be subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds. 
IV 
The firearm regulatory scheme at issue here is consonant 
with the concept of equal protection embodied in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if there is "some 
'rational basis' for the statutory distinctions made ... or ... 
they 'have some relevance to the purpose for which the 
classification is made.' " Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 
417,422 (1H74), quoting from McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 
263, 270 (1973), and Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107, 111 
(1066). ~ee Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).8 
;, The " rational bm>is" t!:'st i:; applicablr lwrr because lcgil:.;]ative rdiance-
upon ('Onvict ;;tatu" is not a l511tliJect cla~~ification, and legislative restric-
tion:; on the ll>'<' of firearm:; do not trench upon any fundamental interest. 
Sec l 'nited States\, Miller, 307 U, S, 17-l, 17R (19;{9) (the Second Amend-
ment guarantep:,; no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have 
"Home rca~unable rei a tiontihip to the pre~ervation or eJf.cirncy of a well 
rt"gulated militia") : United i:)tates v, 'l'hrl'e Winchester 30-30 Caliber 
Lever Actiu11 Carbiue;s , 504 F , 2d 128~, 1290, n . 5 (CAi 1974); United 
States ' , Juhn ;sull, 497 F , 2d 54R (CA-l 1!:17·t); Cudy v. United States, 460 
F. 2d 34 (CAH), C('rt. denied, 40!:1 U.S, 1010 (1!:17:2) (the latter three case::l 
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SectioJJ 1202 (a)( 1) clearly meets that test. Congress, as 
its expressed purpose in enacting Title VII reveals, 18 U. S. C. 
App. § 1201, was concerned that the receipt and possession of 
a firearm by a felon constitutes a threat, among other things, 
to tht> continued and effective operation of the Government of 
the U uited States. The legislative history of the gun coutrol 
laws discloses Cmtgress' worry about the easy availability of 
firearms, especially to those persons who pose a threat to 
community peace. And Congress focused on the nexus be~ 
tween violent crime and the possession of a firearm by any 
person with a criminal record. 114 Cong. Rec. 13220 (1968) 
(remarks of Se11. Tydings); ·id., at 16298 (remarks of Rep. 
Pollock) . Cottgress could rationally conclude that any felony 
conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficie11t basis 
on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm. See e. ., 
United States v. Ransom, 515 F. 2d 91-892 (CA5 1975), cert. 
denied. 424 F . S. 944 (1976). This Court has recognized 
repeatedly that a legislature constitutionally may prohibit a 
con vic ted felon from engaging in activities far more funda-
mental than the right to possess a firearm. See Richardson v. 
Ramirez, 418 L'. S. 24 (1974) (disenfra.nchisement); De"Veau 
v. Brai.~;ted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (proscription against holding 
office in a waterfront labor organization); Hawker v. New 
York, 170 U. 8. 189 ( 1898) (prohibition against the practice 
of medicine) . 1 
We recognize, of course, that under the Sixth Amendment 
an uncounseled felony conviction cannot be used for certain l 
purposes. See B·urgett, Tucker, and Loper, all supra. The 
Court, however, has 11ever suggested that an uncounseled con-
viction is invalid for all purposes. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 
U. R. 367 ( 1979); Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S., at 482, n. 11 
(plurality opinion). 
Use of an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for 
holding, rpsprctivPly, that § 1202 (a) (1), § 922 (g), and § 922 (a.) (6) dn 
not viol::ttf' thr SPc<md AmendmPnt). 
t. 
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imposing a civil firearms disability, enforceable by a criminal 
sanction , is not inconsistent with Burgett, 'Pucker, and Loper. 
In each of those cases, this Court found that the subsequent 
conviction or sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because 
it depf'tHied upon the reliability of a past uucounseled con-
viction. The federal gun laws. however, focus not on reliabil-
ity. but 011 the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in 
onler- to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous per-
sons. C'ongress' judgment that a convicted felon, even one 
whose cou victi011 was allegedly uncounseled. is among the class 
of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or possessing 
firearms because of potential dangerousness is rational. En-
forcement of that essentially civil disability through a crimimil 
sanction doE's not "support guilt or enhance punishment," see 
Buryetf, 389 F. S .. at 115, on the basis of a conviction that is 
umeliable when one considers Cougress' broad purpose. 
Moreover. unlikE' the situation in Burgett, the sanction imposed 
by ~ 1202 (a) (1) attaches immediately upon the defendant's 
first collviction. 
Again. it is important to note that a convicted felon may 
challenge thf' validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise 
remove his disability, before obtaining a firearm. We simply 
hold tuday that the firearms prosecution does not open the 
predicate conviction to a new form of collateral attack. See 
Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
76 Colum. L. Rev. 326, 338-339 (1976). Cf. JFalker v. City 
of B-ir1,1inyham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
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'•SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATml 
No. 18-1595 
peorge Calvin Lewis, Jr.,l . . . . 
· Petitioner On Wnt of Cert10ran to the Umted 
' States Court of Appeals for t4~ 
v. Fourth Circuit. · 
United States. 
[February -, 19~9] 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN deliv~red the opinion of the Court, 
This case presents the questiqn whether a defendant'~ 
extant prior conviction, flawed becau13e he was without coun-
sel, as required by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 
may constitute the predicate for a subsequent conviction under 
§ 1202 (a)(1) , as amended, of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. App, 
§ 1202 (a) (1).1 
I 
In 1961 petitioner George Calvin Lewis, Jr., upon his plea 
1 Section 1202 (a) reads in full: 
~'Any person who-
" ( 1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or 
any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or 
"(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable 
conditions, or 
"(3) ha~ been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a State 
or any political subdivi~ion thereof of being mentally incompetent, or 
" ( 4) having been a citizen of the United State;; has renounced his citi-
zenship, or 
"(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, 
"and who receivrs, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting com-
merce, after the date of enactment of thi;; Act, any firearm shall be fined 
r.ot more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or 
both." 
78-1595-0PINION 
2 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES 
of guilty, was convicted in a Florida state court of a felony 
for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misde· 
meanor. See Fla. Stat. § 810.05 (1961). He served a term of 
imprisonment. That conviction has never been overturned, 
nor has petitioner ever received a qualifying pardon or per· 
mission from the Secretary of the Treasury to possess a fire. 
arm. See 18 U. S. C. App. § 1203 (a) and 18 U. S. C. 
§ 925 (c). 
In January 1977, Lewis, on probable cause, was a.rrested in 
Virginia, and later was charged by indictment with having 
knowingly received and possessed at that time a specified 
firearm, in violation of 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202 (a) (1).2 He 
waived a jury and was given a bench trial. It was stipulated 
that the weapon in question had been shipped in interstate 
commerce. The Government introduced in evidence an exem· 
plified copy of the judgment and sentence in the 1961 Florida 
felony proceeding. App. 10. 
Shortly before the trial, petitioner's counsel informed the 
court that he had been advised that Lewis was not represented 
by counsel iu the 1961 Florida proceeding.3 He claimed that 
2 The indictment also charged petitioner with a violation of 18 U. S. C. 
§922 (h)(l). That statute rea.dt:> in pertinent part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person-
"(!) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any 
court of, a crime pumshable by imprbonment for a term exceeding one 
year; 
"to reooive any firearm . .. which has been shipped or transported in 
interstate . .. commerce." 
Petitioner was acquitted on the § 922 (h) (1) charge and it is not before 
us here. 
3 Petitioner's coun::;el stated that a Florida attorney had advised him 
that the court records in that State showed affirmatively that Lewis had 
no lawyer. He noted also that Lewis had been charged with the same 
offense as had the defendant in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 
(1963) , and tl11tt petitioner had been tried in the same State about six 
month::; before Gideon wa<:> tried. App. 2-3. 
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under Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, a violation of § 1202 
(a)(1) could not be predicated on a prior conviction obtained 
in violation of petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. The court rejected that claim, ruling that the con-
stitutionality of the outstanding Florida conviction was imma-
terial with respect to petitioner's status under § 1202 (a)(1) 
as a previously convicted felon at the time of his arrest. Peti-
tioner, accordingly, offered no evidence as to whether in fact 
he had been convicted in 1961 without the aid of counsel. We 
therefore assume, for present purposes, that he was without 
counsel at that time. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed. 591 F. 2d 978 
(1979). It held that a defendant, purely as a defense to a 
prosecution under § 1202 (a) (1). could not atta;ck collaterally 
an outstanding prior felony conviction, and that the statutory 
prohibition applied irrespective of whether that prior convic-
tion was subject to collateral attack. The Court of Appeals 
also rejected Lewis' constitutional argument to the effect that 
the use of the prior conviction as a predicate for his prosecu-
tion under § 1202 (a) (1) violated his rights under the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments. 
Because of conflict among the Courts of Appeals,• we 
granted certiorari. 442 U. S.- (1979) . 
4 Compare United States v. Lufman, 457 F. 2d 165 (CA7 1972) (use of 
an underlying felony conviction unconstitutionally obtained to support a 
conviction under § 1202 (a) (1) is reversible error) with the Fourth Cir-
cuit's ruling in the present case, and with United States v. Maggard, 573 
F. 2d 926 (CA6 1978); m1d United States v. Graves, 554 F. 2d 65 (CA3 
1977) (en bane) (claim of con:;titutional error in the underlying convic-
tion may not be raised). The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between a 
claim of con:;titutional invalidity in the underlying conviction, which it has 
held may be raised, and a claim that the underlying conviction has been, 
cr should be, reversed on other ground:;. Compare United Stat·es v. 
O'Neal, 545 F. 2d 85 (1976), and United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F. 2d 
417 (1976), with United States v. Liles, 432 F. 2d 18 (1970). See also 
United States v. Herrell, 588 F . 2d 711 (CA9 1978), cert. denied, 440 
•f 
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II 
Four cases decided by .this Court provide the focus for peti-
tioner's attack upon his conviction. The first, and pivotal 
one, is Gideon v. Wainwright; supra, where the Court held that 
a state felony conviction without counsel, and without a valid 
waiver of counsel, was unconstitutional· under the Sixth and' 
U. S. 964 (1979) (underlying conviction in a prosecution under 18 U.S. C. 
§ 922 (h) (1) may not be challenged on nonconstitutional grounds). 
The identical issue that is presented in this case has also Rrisen in the 
context of challenges to convictions under 18 U. S. C. § 922 (g) (1) (pro-
scribing shipping or transport of a firearm in interstate or foreign com-
merce by a person under indictment for, or convicted of, a felony) and 
§ 922 (h) (1) (proocribing receipt of a firearm shipped in interstate or 
foreign commerce by such a person). Compare United States v. Scales, 
599 F. 2d 78 (CA5 1979); Dameron v. United States, 488 F. 2d 724 (CA5 
1974); Pasterchik v. United States, 466 F. 2d 1367 (CA9 1972); and 
United States v. DuShane, 435 F. 2d 187 (CA2 1970) (underlying convic-
tion may be attacked a::; unconstitutional) with Barker v. · United States, 
579 F. 2d 1219, 1226 (CAlO 1978) (underlying conviction may not be so 
challenged in prosecution under §922 (h)(1)). 
The Courts of Appeals have treated the issue somewhat differently in 
prosecutions under 18 U. S. C. § 922 (a) (6) (prohibiting the falsification 
of one's status as a convicted felon in purchasing a firearm). Nonuniform-
ity has prevailed nonetheless on the question whether a defendant charged 
with violating that statute may challenge the constitutionality of the 
underlying felony conviction. Compare United States v. O'Neal, supra, 
and United States v. Pricepaul, s·upra, (permitting the challenge) with 
United States v. Allen, 556 F. 2d 720 (CA4 1977); United States v. 
Graves, supm; and Cassit·y v. United States, 521 F. 2d 1320 (CA6 1975) 
(holding that the challenge may not. be made). The Eighth Circuit has 
lOtated that it will not permit a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
underlying conviction where the defendant is charged under § 922 (a) (6), 
while reserving the question undpr § 1202 (a) (1) and §§ 922 (g) (1) and 
(h)(1) . United States v. Edwards, 568 F. 2d 68, 70-72, and n. 3 (1977) . 
See also United States v. Graves, 554 F. 2d, at 83-88 (Garth, J ., & Seitz, 
G. J., concurring & dissenting) (the Government need not prove the 
validity of the underlying conviction in a pro~ecution brought under § 922 
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Fourteenth Amendments. That ruling is fully retroactive. 
Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971). 
The second case is Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967). 
There the Court held that a conviction invalid under Gideon 
could not be used for enhancement of punishment under a 
State's recidivist statute. The third is United States v. 
Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972), where it was held that such a 
conviction could not be considered by a court in sentencing 
a defendant after a subsequent conviction. And the fourth is 
Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473 (1972), where the Court dis-
allowed the use of the conviction to impeach the general 
credibility of the defendant. The prior conviction, the plural-
ity opinion said, "lacked reliability." I d., at 484, quoting 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 639, and n. 20 (1965). 
We, of course, accept these rulings for purposes of the 
present case. Petitioner's position, however, is that the four 
~ases require a reversal of his conviction under § 1202 (a) (1) 
on both statutory and constitutional grounds. 
III 
The Court has stated repeatedly of late that in any case 
concerning the interpretation of a statute the "starting point" 
must be the language of the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone 
Corp.,- U.S.-,- (1979) (slip op., pp. 3-4). See also 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, - U. S. -, - (1979) 
(slip op., pp. 7-8); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 
-U.S.-,- (1979) (slip op. , p. 6). An examination of 
§ 1202 (a) (1) reveals that its proscription is directed unam-
biguously at any person who "has been convicted by a court 
of the United States or of a State ... of a felony." No modi-
fier is present, and nothing suggests any restriction on the 
scope of the term "convicted." "Nothing on the face of the 
statute suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage 
to persons [whose convictions are not subject to collateral 
attack]." United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373 ( 1978); 
see United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772 (1979). The 
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statutory language is sweeping, and its plain meaning is that 
the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability 
until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his 
disability by some affirma.tive action, such as a qualifying 
pardon or a consent from the Secretary of the Treasury.5 The 
obvious breadth of the language may well reflect the expan· 
sive legislative approach revealed by Congress' express find-
ings and declarations, in 18 U. S. C. App. § 1201,6 concerning 
5 One might argue, of coursP, that the language is so sweeping that it 
includes in its proscription even a person whose predicate conviction in 
the interim had bPCn finally reversed on appeal and thus no longer was 
outstanding. The Government, however, does not go so far, Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 29-30, 37-40, and though we have no need to pursue that extreme 
argument in this case, we reject it. We are not persuaded that the mere 
possibility of making that argument renders the statute, as petitioner sug-
gests, unconstitutionally vague. And unlike the dissent, post, at 2, we 
view the language Congre<:~s chose as consistent with the common-sense 
notion that a disability based upon one's status as a convicted felon 
should cease only when the conviction upon which that status depends 
has been vacated. 
We note, nonetheless, that the disability effected by § 1202 (a) (I) would 
apply while a felony conviction was pending on appeal. See Note, Prior 
Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 326, 334, 
and n. 42 (1976) . 
6 "The Congress hereby finds and decla.res that the receipt, possession, 
or transportation of a firearm by felons, veterans who are discharged under 
dishonorable conditions, mental incompetents, aliens who are illegally in 
the country, and former citizens who have renounced their citizenship, 
constitutes-
" ( 1) a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce, 
"(2) a threat to the safety of the President of the United States and 
Vice President of the United States, 
"(3) an impediment or a threat to the exercise of free speech and the 
free exercise of a religion guaranteed by the first amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, and 
" ( 4) a threat to ihe continued and effective operation of the Govern-
ment of the United States and of the government of each State guaran-
" teed by article IV of the Constitution." 
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the problem of firearm abuse by felons and certain specifically 
described persons. 
Other provisions of the statute demonstrate and reinforce 
its broad sweep. Section 1203 enumerates exceptions to 
§ 1202 (a) ( 1) (a prison inmate who by reason of his duties has 
expressly been entrusted with a firearm by prison authority; 
a person who has been pardoned and who has expressly been 
authorized to receive, possess, or transport a firearm). In 
addition, § 1202 (c)(2) defines "felony" to exclude certain 
state crimes punishable by po more than two years imprison-
ment. No exception, however, . is made for a person whose, 
outstanding felony conviction ultimately might turn out to be 
invalid for any reason. On its face, therefore, § 1202 (a) (1) 
contains nothing by way of restrictive language. It thus 
stands in contrast with other federal statutes that explicitly 
permit a defendant to challenge, by way of defense, the valid- . 
ity or constitutionality of the predicate felony. See, e. g., 18 
U.S. C.§ 3575 (e) (dangerous special offender) and 21 U.S. C. 
§ 851 (c) (2) (recidivism under the Comprehensive Drug Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970). 
When we turn to the legislative history of § 1202 (a) ( 1), we 
find nothing to suggest that Congress was willing to allow a , 
defendant to question the validity of his prior conviction as a 
defense to a charge under § 1202 (a) ( 1). The section was 
enacted as part of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, 82 Stat. 236. It was added by 
way of a floor amendment to the Act and thus was not a sub-
ject of discussion in the legislative reports. See United States 
v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 120 (1979); Scarborough v. 
United States, 431 U. S. 563, 569-570 (1977); United States 
v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 344, and n. 11 (1971). What little 
legislative history there is that is relevant reflects an intent 
to impose a firearms disability on any felon based on the 
face of conviction. Senator Long, who introduced and di-
rected the passage of Title VII, repea.tedly stressed convic-
tion, not a "valid" conviction, and not a conviction hot §ubject · 
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to constitutional challenge, as the criterion. For example, the 
Senator observed: 
"So, under Title VII, every citizen could possess a gun until 
the commission of his first felony. Upon his conviction, 
however, Title VII would deny every assassin, murderer, 
thief and burglar of the right to possess a firearm in the 
future except where he has been pardoned by the Presi.:. 
dent or a State Governor and had been expressedly au-
thorized by his pardon to possess a firearm." 114 Cong. 
Rec. 14773 (1968). 
See also id., at 13868, 14774. Inasmuch as Senator Long was 
the sponsor and floor manager of the bill, his statements are 
entitled to weight. Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 
13 (1978). 
It is not without significance, furthermore, that Title VII, 
as well as Title IV of the Omnibus Act, was enacted in re-
sponse to the precipitous rise in political assassinations, riots, 
and other violent crimes involving firearms, that occurred in 
this country in the 1960's. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 76-78 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 22-23 (1968). This Court, accordingly, has observed: 
"The legislative history [of Title VII] in its entirety, 
while brief, further supports the view that Congress 
sought to rule broadly-to keep guns out of the hands of 
those who have demonstrated that 'they may not be 
trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to 
society.' " Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S., at 
572. 
The legislative history, therefore, affords no basis for a 
loophole, by way of a collateral constitutional challenge, to 
the broad statutory scheme enacted by Congress. Section 
1202 (a) was a sweeping prophylaxis, in simple terms, against 
misuse of firearms. There is no indication of any intent to 
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,equire the Government to prove the validity of the predicate 
conviction. 
The very structure of the Omnibus Act's Title IV, enacted 
simultaneously with Title VII, reinforces this conclusion. 
Each Title prohibits categories of presumptively dangerous 
persons from transporting or receiving firearms. See 18 
U. S. C. §§ 922 (g) and (h). Actually, with regard to the 
statutory question at issue here, we detect little significant 
difference between Title IV and Title VII. Each seeks to 
keep a firearm away from "any person ... who has been con-
victed" of a felony, although the definition of "felony" differs 
somewhat in the respective statutes. But to limit the scope of 
§§ 922 (g) (1) and (h)(1) to a validly convicted felon would 
be at cdds with the statutory scheme as a whole. Those sec .. 
tions not only impose a disability on a convicted felon but also 
on a person under a felony indictment, even if that person 
subsequently is acquitted of the felony charge. Since the 
fact of mere indictment is a disabling circumstance, a fortiori 
the much more significant fact of conviction must deprive the 
person of a right to a firearm. 
Finally, it is important to note that a convicted felon is 
not without relief. As has been observed above, the Omnibus 
Act, in § § 1203 (2) and 925 (c), states that the disability may 
be removed by a qualifying pardon or the Secretary's consent 
Also, petitioner, before obtaining his firearm, could have chal-
lenged his prior conviction in an appropriate proceeding in 
the Florida state courts. See Fla. Const. Art. 5, § 5 (3); 
L'Hommedieu v. State, 362 So. 2d 72 (Fla. App. 1978); Weir 
v. State, 319 So. 2d 80 (Fla. App. 1975). See also United 
States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502 (1954) .7 
It seems fully apparent to us that the existence of these 
remedies, two of which are expressly contained in the Omnibus 
7 This being so, § 1202 (a) (1) doe:snot attach "what may amount to life-
long sanctions to a mere finding of probable cause," as has been argued by 
one commentator. See Comment, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1790, 1795 (1979). 
,I 
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Act itself, suggests that Congress clearly intended that the 
defendant clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby 
fulfilling Congress' purpose "broadly to keep firearms away 
from the persons Congress classified as potentia.lly irrespon-
sible and dangerous." Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S. 212, 
218 (1976). 
With the face of the statute and the legislative history so 
clear, petitioner's argument that the statute nevertheless 
should be construed so as to avoid a constitutional issue is 
inapposite. That course is appropriate only when the statute 
provides a fair alternative construction. This statute could 
not be more plain. Swain v. Press[y, 430 U. S. 370, 378, and 
n. 11 (1977); United States v. Batchelder, - U. S., at-
(slip op., pp. 7-8). Similarly, any principle of lenity, see 
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), has no 
application. The touchstone of that principle is statutory 
ambiguity. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 832 
(1974); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S., at 121-122. 
There is no ambiguity here. 
We therefore hold that§ 1202 (a)(l) prohibits a felon from 
possessing a firearm despite the fact that the predicate felony 
may be subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds. 
IV 
The firearm regulatory scheme at issue here is consonant 
with the concept of equal protection embodied in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if there is "some 
1rational basis' for the statutory distinctions made ... or ... 
they 1have some relevance to the purpose for which the 
classification is made.'" Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 
417, 422 (1974), quoting from McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 
263, 2i0 (1973), and Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107, Ill 
(1966). See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).8 
8 These legislative restrictions on the u;;e of firearms are neither based 
upon constitutionally suspect criteri<L, nor do they trench upon any con-
\ 
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Section 1202 (a)(1) clearly meets that test. Congress, as 
its expressed purpose in enacting Title VII reveals, 18 U. S. C. 
App. § 1201, was concerned that the receipt and possession of 
a firearm by a felon constitutes a threat, among other things, 
to the continued and effective operation of the Government of 
the United States. The legislative history of the gun control 
laws discloses Congress' worry about the easy availability of 
firearms, especially to those persons who pose a threat to 
community peace. And Congress focused on the nexus be~ 
tween violent crime and the possession of a firearm by any 
person with a criminal record. 114 Cong. Rec. 13220 (1968) 
(remarks of Sen. Tydings); {d., at 16298 (remarks of Rep. 
Pollock). Congress could rationally conclude that any felony 
conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficient basis 
on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm. See, e. g., 
United States v. Ransom, 515 F. 2d 885, 891-892 (CA5 1975), 
cert. denied , 424 U. S. 944 ( 1976). This Ccmrt has recognized 
repeatedly that a legislature constitutionally may prohibit a 
convicted felon from engaging in activities far more funda-
mental than the possession of a firearm. See Richardson v. 
Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24 (1974) (disenfranchisement); DeVeau 
v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (proscription against holding 
office in a waterfront labor organization); Hawker v. New 
York, 170 U. S. 189 ( 1898) (prohibition against the practice 
of medicine). 
We recognize, of course, that under the Sixth Amendment 
an uncounseled felony conviction cannot be used for certain 
stitutionally protected liberties. See United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 
174, 178 (1939) (the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and 
bear a firearm that doe~ not have "~orne reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.") ; United States v. 
Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F. 2d 1288, 
1290, n. 5 (CA7 1975); United States v. Johnson, 497 F. 2d 548 (CA4 
1974) ; Cody v. United States, 460 F. 2d 34 (CAB), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1010 (1972) (the latter three case~ holding, respectively, that§ 1202 (a.) (1), 
§922 (g), and §922 (a)(6) do not violate the Second Amendment). 
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purposes. See Burgett, Tucker, and Loper, all supra. The 
Court, however, has never suggested 'tHat an uncounseled con-
viction is invalid for all purposes. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 
U. S. 367 (1979); Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S., at 482, n, 1~ 
(plurality opinion). 
Use of an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for 
imposing a civil firearms disability, enforceable by a criminal 
sanction, is not inconsistent with Burgett, Tucker, and Loper. 
In each of those cases, this Court found that the subsequent 
~onviction or sentence violated the Sixth Amendment becau~e 
it depended upon the reliability of a '· past uncounseled con-
viction. The federal gun laws, however, focus not on reliabil-
ity, but on the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in 
order to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous per-
sons. Congress' judgment that a convicted felon, even one 
whose conviction was allegedly uncounseled, is among the class 
of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or possessing 
firearms because of potential dangerousness is rational,D En-
forcement of that essentially civil disability through a criminal 
sanction does not "support guilt or enhance punishment," seE( 
Burgett, 389 U. S., at 115, on the basis of a conviction that is 
Unreliable when one considers Congress' broad purpose. 
Moreover, unlike the situation in Burgett, the sanction imposed 
b'y § 1202 (a) (1) attaches immediately upon the defendant's 
first conviction. 
Again, it is important to note that a convicted felon may 
phallenge the validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise 
remove his disability, before obtaining a firearm. We simply 
hold today that the firearms prosecution does not open the 
predicate conviction to a new form of collateral attack. See 
9 The disl:lent's a:::sertion that CongrE'Ss' judgment in thi~; regard cannot 
rationally be supported, post , at 5, is one we do not share. Moreover, 
such an as.~ertion seems. plainly inconsistent with the deference that a 
reviewing court ::;hould give to a legi8lative determination that, in e::;::;ence, 
predicts a potential for future criminal behavior. 
' .. 
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Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, ,, . 
7Q.' Colum. L. Rev. 326, 338-339 (1976). .Cf. Walker v. Ctty 
o('Binningham, 388 U.S; 307 (1967). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
it is so ordered. 
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MR. JusTICE BR~<::NNAN , dissenting. 
In disagreement with every other· court of a:rpeals that has 
a,ddressed the issuc, 1 the· Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, held, by a divided vote, that an uncounseled and 
hence unconstitutional felony conviction may 'form the predi-
cate for conviction undPr ~ 1202 (a) (.1) · of the Omnibus· 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act ·of Hl68. Today the 
&>urt a.fflrms that judgment, but by an an11lysis that cannot 
be squared either with the literal lang~.Jage of the statute 
or controlling decisions of this Court,1 l respectfully dissent. 
i 
Two longstanding principles of statutory ·construction inde-
pendently mapdfl.te reversal of petitioner's conviction. The · 
first is the precept that "when choice has to be made between 
two readings of what conduct Congress bas made a crime, it is 
appropriate, before we choose the h11rsher alternative, to 
require that Congress should have spoken in language that is 
clear and definite." United States y. Universal C. I. T. Credit 
Corp. , 344 U. S. 218, 221-222 (1~52), '],.'he Court has re-
1 See, e1 g., Dumeron v. United States, 488 F. 2q 724 (CA5 1974); 
United States v. Lufma:n, 457 F. 2d 165 (CA7 1972); United States v. 
DuShane, 4:~5 F. 2d 187 (CA2 1970); United States v. Thoreson, 428 F. 
2d 654 ~CA9 1970) . See generally Comment1 92 l1arv. L. Rev. 1790 
(197~), 
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peatedly reaffirmed-this "rule of lenity." See, e. g., Simpson 
v. Un'ited States, 435 U.S. 6, 14 (1978); United States v. Bass, 
404 U. S. 336, 347-349 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 
U. S. 808, 812 (1971); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 
177 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81 (1955). In-
deed, the principle that "au1biguity concerning the ambit of 
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity" has 
previously been invoked in interpreting the very provision 
at issue i11 this case. See UnitfJd -states v. Bass, supra. 
The Court declines to apply this established rule of con-
struction in this case because. in its view, "l t J here is no 
ambiguity here." Ante, a,t 10. In light of the gloss the 
Court place~ ou the litE>ral language of the statute, I find 
this to be a curious conclusion. By its own terms, § 1202 
(a)(l) reaclws "any person who has been convicted . .. of a 
felony. " The provision on its face a,dmits of no exception to 
its sweeping proscriptio11. Y f't despite the absence of auy 
qualifying ,phrase. the Court concedes-as it must-that the 
statutP cannot be interpreted so as to include those persons 
whose predicate convictions have been vacated or reversed 011 
appeal. Ante, at 6, and n. 5. 
It thus appears that the plain words of § 1202 (a) (1) are 
not so clear after aJl, aHd Wf' therefore must determine the 
section's reach. Two a1ternative constructions are offered: 
The first is the Government's-that § 1202 (a) (1) may be 
read to permit only outstanding felony convictions to serve 
as the basis for prosecution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30. The 
second is petitioner's-that the predicate conviction must not 
only be outstanding, but also constitutionally valid. Because 
either interpretation fairly comports with the statutory lan-
guage, surely the principle of lenity requires us to resolve :;tny 
doubts against the harsher alternative and to read the statute 
to prohibit the possession of firearms only by those who have 
been constitutionally convicted of a f~lony. 
!fhe Court nev~rth~less adopts ~he O~v~rnment's rl)nsttruc,. 
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tion, relying on a supposed legislative resolve to enact a 
sweeping measure against the misuse of firearms. But how-
ever expansive § 1202 was meant to be, we ~re not faithful 
to "our duty to protect the rights of the individual," Dalia. 
v. United States, 441 U. S. 238, 263 (1979) ( STEVENS, J., dis-
sen ting), when we are so quick to ascribe to Congress the 
intent to punish the possession of a firearm by a person whose \ 
predicate f<'lony conviction was obtained in violation of the 
right to the assistance of counsel, "one of the safeguards of the 
Sixth Amendment deemed ncc('ssary to insure fundamental 
human rights of life and liberty. '' Johnson v. Zerbst, 3!» 
U. S. 458, 462 (1938). Petitioner has once already been im-
prisoned in violation of the Constitution. In the absence 
of any clear congressional expression of its intent, I cannot 
accept a construction of ~ 1202 (a) (1 )' that reflects such an 
indifference to petitio11er's plight and such a derogation of the 
principles of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).2 
2 As the Court, has pr·rviously oh~rrved, '§ 1202 "'was hastilr pass~d, 
w'it.h little cli~cu~;;ion, no hettring:.:, and no report,.'' United States v. 
Bass, 404 l'. S. :3:36,:344 (1971). ''In :-:hort, ' the legisla.llive hi.;tory of [the] 
Act. hardly spPakH with that elarit~· of purpo~e which Congress ~upposedly 
furnishrs conrt>< in ordPr to PnahlP thrm t.o enforce its tnlC will.'" I d., 
nt 846 (quot-ing Cnium;al Came1'a Corp. v. NLI~B, 340 U. S. 474, 483 
(1951) ) . 1!. is tlJU:-; little wonder that the Comt. finds no explicit support 
in the ;;.tatut(''"' legislat.ivC' hi:;tory for petitionrr'8 con::.inrcti011. 
Nor do the few t;Jgnpo:-;ts that do exi~t in the history and :structure of 
Title VII point. unnmbiguou;:ly to thP Court/:; conclusion. That Congress 
included provii'iion~< wit.hin the Omnibu:o: Act whereby a convicted felon 
could have hiR di~abilit~r removed b~· a qualifying pardon or the Secre~ 
tary's con>"Put., l"it't' §§ l:!o:3 (2) and 925 (c), does not mean that, Congrc~s 
intenck•d th('lll to h(1 Pxclusive remrdir,;. Indeed, the~t> provi:;ions were 
clearly dC':>igned only t<l provide a mechani"m for tho::;e twrson~ with 
valid fplony convict ion:,: to l"ieek n•lief from the prohibitions of § 1202. 
Similnrly, a compari~on betwP('Jl the' ::;cope of Title IV and Titl€'1 VII 
is uncnlightC'ning on thr quel"ilion hdorl' u,;. Simply because U1e former 
sect ion impo:.:eR a di"ability on a.n~· ]Wt'::<on under n felon~ · indictment, it' 
by no mran" follow,:, a fo1'ti01i or othet·wi"(', that. Congre:;f' intended hy the 
latter "ect·iou l<J itullO>ll' '~ :-;onwwhat, ha.r:-:hrr rli"ability on those person~ 
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The second maxim of statutory construction that comp('ls 
a narrow reading of ~ 1202 (a)( 1) is the "cardinal principle" 
that "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, ... 
this Court will first ascertain whC'ther a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be 
avoided." C1·owell Y. Bensuu, 285 U. S. 22. 62 (1932). Accord. 
Schneider v. Smith, 390 1J. A. 17. 26 (1968); United States 
v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. 45 ( 1953); United Stales v. C. I. 0., 
335 U. A. 106. 120-121. and n. 20 (1948). And doubts as to 
the constitutio11ality of a statute that could predicate criminal 
liability solely ou tlw existellC(' of a previous uncounseled 
felony COilvictio11 arc> indeed S('rions. for a trilogy of this Court's 1 
decisions would S('('ll1 to proh ihit wecis('ly such a result. 
Burgett "· 'l'e:ras, 389 r. R. 109 (1967). held that a prio·r 
uncoutlSe1<'d felony conviction wl:IS void and thus inadmissible 
in a proS{'eution under a Texas recidivist statut('. Burgett 
stated: "To permit a conviction ohtain<'d in violation of Gideon 
v. vVainwriuht to be us<·d against a p('rson either to support 
guilt or enhance punishment for another offense ... is to 
erode the principle of that case. \Yorse yet. since the defect 
in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the 
accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that 
Sixth Amendment right." ld .. at 115 (citation omitt('d). 
United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 ( 1972), and Loper v. 
with uuron:stitutional frlony conviction,;. Cf. ante, at. 9. Siguifieantly, 
the re~trietion~ attaching to an individual under indictmC'nt. a.rC' nree;;-
sarily [.C'mpora.r:v, whilt> tho.'iP im]>OSPd on the hasiN of a prc•viouH <'ouvic-
tion are inddini1<\ in duration. ~forP0\'<'1', Congrr~:<' failurr to include 
pNsous "undrr indictnwnt" within til<' pro:<eription:< of § 1202 morr plau-
sibly signall:i itf< dP~irc to demand a gn•:\trr indication of pot entia] da.nger-
ousne;o;N tha11 would be provided by the mere fact of indictment-or, for 
that. matlrr, by all uncoun><clrd ft>lony co11viction. In fad, in a. !'\lightly 
differenL eonlext, Congrr~,; has cxprrs~l~· n•jrcted U1e proposition that an 
invalid prior couvictiou i::> a reli~tblr indicator of ''dnJJgerousne~~." Sec H~ 
V: S. C: § 3575 (c) (~augerous ~pPcial offPnder): 
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Beto, 405 U. S. 473 (1972), respectively prohibited the use _ 
of uncounseled. felony convictions as a factor to be considereq I 
in sentencing, and to impeach the defendant's credibility. 
Burgett and its progeny appear to co11trol the result in this / 
case. The clear teaching of those d:ecisions is that an uncoun-
scled felony convictiol1 can never be Used "to support guilt or 
enhance punishment for another offimse." Here, petitioner 
could n~t have been ttie~ ~nd con_victed for violat~n~ § 1202' \ 
(&)(1) m the absence of Ius prE!Vtous fEllony conviCtiOn. It 
could not be plainer tnat his constitutionally void. conviction 
was therefore used "to support guilt" for the current offense. 
The Court's bald assertion to tlie contrary is simply 
inexplicable. 
The Court's attempt to distinguish Burgett, Tucker, and 
Loper on the ground that thf' validity of the subsequent 
convictions or sentences in those cases depended on the re-
liability of the prior uncounseled felony convictions, while in 
the presfnt case the law focuses on the mere fact of the prior 
·conviction, is unconvincing. The fundamentfl,l rationale be-
hind those decisions was the concern that according any 
credibility to an uncounseled conviction would seriously erode 
the protections of the Sixth Amendment. Congress' decision 
to include convicted felons within the class of persons pro-
hibited from possessing firearms can rationally be supported 
only if the historical fact of conviction is indeed a reliable 
indicator of potential dangerousness. As we have so often 
said, denial of the right to counsel impeaches "the very integ-
rity of the fact-finding process." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 
U. S. 618, 639 (1965). Accord, Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 
333, 341 (1978); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 31 
(1972). And the absence of counsel impairs the reliability 
of a felony conviction just as much when used to prove po- { 
tial dangerousness as wfwn used as direct proof of guilt. lj 
lA. Loper v. Beto, supra, 405 U. S., at 483 (opinion of / 
STEWART, J .). 
,·.· 
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Finally, it is simply irrelevant that petitioner could have 
challenged the validity of his prior conviction in appropriate 
proceedings in the state courts. Nor can the existence of 
such a remedy prohibit him from raising the unconstitution-
ality of that conviction as a defehse to the present charge. 
In the first place, neither Burgett nor Loper imposed any 
requirement that a defendant collaterally attack his uncoun-
seled conviction before he faces prosecution under § 1202 
(a) ( 1); in both cases the Court held the use of the prior 
invalid convictions impermissible even though the defendants 
had taken no affirmative steps to have them overturned. 
More to the point, however, where the very defect in the 
initial proceedings was that the accused did not have the 
assistance of counsel in defending the felony charges against 
him, it simply defies reason and sensibility to suggest that 
the defendant must be regarded as having waived his defense 
to the § 1202 (a) ( 1) prosecution because he failed first to 
reta:in counsel to seek an extraordinary writ of coram nobis. 
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